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Abstract
Pandemic response is a complex affair. Most governments employ a set of quasi-
standard measures to fight COVID-19 including wearing masks, social distancing, virus
testing and contact tracing. We argue that some non-trivial factors behind the vary-
ing effectiveness of these measures are selfish decision-making and the differing national
implementations of the response mechanism. In this paper, through simple games, we
show the effect of individual incentives on the decisions made with respect to wearing
masks and social distancing, and how these may result in a sub-optimal outcome. We also
demonstrate the responsibility of national authorities in designing these games properly
regarding the chosen policies and their influence on the preferred outcome. We promote
a mechanism design approach: it is in the best interest of every government to carefully
balance social good and response costs when implementing their respective pandemic re-
sponse mechanism.
1 Introduction
The current coronavirus pandemic is pushing individuals, businesses and governments to the
limit. People suffer owing to restricted mobility, social life and income, complete business
sectors face an almost 100% drop in revenue, and governments are scrambling to find out when
and how to impose and remove restrictions. In fact, COVID-19 has turned the whole planet into
a “living lab” for human and social behavior where feedback on response measures employed
is only delayed by two weeks (the incubation period). From the 24/7 media coverage, all of
us have seen a set of quasi-standard measures introduced by national and local authorities,
including wearing masks, social distancing, virus testing, contact tracing and so on. It is also
clear that different countries have had different levels of success employing these measures as
evidenced by the varying normalized death tolls and confirmed cases1.
We believe that apart from the intuitive (e.g., genetic differences, medical infrastructure
availability, hesitancy, etc.), there are two factors that have not received enough attention.
First, the individual incentives of citizens, e.g., “is it worth more for me to stay home than
to meet my friend?”, have a significant say in every decision situation. While some of those
incentives can be inherent to personality type, clearly there is a non-negligible rational aspect
to it, where individuals are looking to maximize their own utility. Second, countries have
differed in the specific implementation of response measures, e.g., whether they have been
distributing free masks (affecting the efficacy of mask wearing in case of equipment shortage)
or providing extra unemployment benefits (affecting the likelihood of proper self-imposed social
distancing). Framing pandemic response as a mechanism design problem, i.e., architecting a
complex response mechanism with a preferred outcome in mind, can shed light on these factors;
∗Although in the same institute, authors have collaborated remotely.
1Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
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what’s more, it has the potential to help authorities (mechanism designers) fight the pandemic
efficiently.
In this paper we model decision situations during a pandemic with game theory where
participants are rational, and the proper design of the games could be the difference between
life and death. Our main contribution is two-fold. First, regarding decisions on wearing a mask,
we show that i) the equilibrium outcome is not socially optimal under full information, ii) when
the status of the players are unknown the equilibrium is not to wear a mask for a wide range of
parameters, and iii) when facing an infectious player it is almost always optimal to wear a mask
even with low protection efficiency. Furthermore, for social distancing, using current COVID-
19 statistics we showed that i) going out is only rational when it corresponds to either a huge
benefit or staying home results in a significant loss, and ii) we determined the optimal duration
and meeting size of such an out-of-home activity. Second, we take a look at pandemic response
from a mechanism design perspective, and demonstrate that i) different government policies
influence the outcome of these games profoundly, and ii) individual response measures (sub-
mechanisms) are interdependent. Specifically, we discuss how contact tracing enables targeted
testing which in turn reduces the uncertainty in individual decision making regarding both
social distancing and wearing masks. We recommend governments treat pandemic response as
a mechanism design problem when weighing response costs vs. the social good.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes related
work. Section 3 develops and analyzes the Mask Game adding uncertainty, mask efficiency
and multiple players to the basic model. Section 4 develops and analyzes the Distancing
Game including the effect of meeting duration and size. Section 5 frames pandemic response
as a mechanism design problem using the design of the two games previously introduced as
examples. Finally, Section 6 outlines future work and concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Here we briefly review some related research efforts. For a more complete survey we refer the
reader to [3].
In [13], the authors modeled the behavioral changes of people to a pandemic using evolu-
tionary game theory, and showed that slightly reducing the number of people an individual is in
contact with can make a difference to the spread of disease. In [17] the authors focused on the
traveling habits of people between areas affected differently by the disease, and found conflict
between the Nash equilibrium (individually optimal strategy) and the Social Optimum (opti-
mal group strategy) only under specific changes in economic and epidemiological conditions.
In line with our mask game, in [6], individuals change their behavior during an epidemic in
response to whether they and those they interact with are susceptible or infected. The authors
show that there is a critical level of concern, i.e., empathy, by the infected individuals above
which the disease is eradicated rapidly. In line with our social distancing game, in [14], the
authors studied how individuals would best use social distancing and related self-protective
behaviors during an epidemic. The study found that in the absence of vaccination or other
intervention measures, optimal social distancing never recovers more than 30% of the cost
of infection. Authors of [2] studied the vaccination behavior of people. The designed model
exhibits a “wait and see” Nash equilibrium strategy, with vaccine delayers relying on herd
immunity, and vaccine safety information generated by early vaccinators. Finally, the game-
theoretic model in [15] focuses on the various level of drug stockpiles in different countries, and
find controversial results: sometimes there is an optimal solution of a central planner (such as
the WHO), which improves the decentralized equilibrium, but other times the central plan-
ner’s solution (minimizing the number of infected persons globally) requires some countries to
sacrifice part of their population.
2
Game Notations
To improve readability, we summarize all the parameters and variables used for the Mask and
the Distancing Game in Table 1.
Mask Game Distancing Game
Variable Meaning Variable Meaning
Cout Cost of playing out C Cost of staying home
Cin Cost of playing in B Benefit of going out
Ci Cost of being infected m Mortality rate of the virus
Cuse Cost of playing use L Value of Life of an individual
ρ Probability of being infected ρ Probability of infection
p Probability of using a mask p Probability of meeting
a Protection Efficiency t Time duration of the meeting
b Spreading Efficiency g Group size of a meeting
Table 1: The parameters of the games.
3 The Mask Game
Probably the most visible consequence of COVID-19 are the masks: before their usage was
mostly limited to some Asian countries, hospitals, banks (in case of a robbery), and some other
places. Due to the coronavirus pandemic, an unprecedented spreading of mask-wearing can be
seen around the globe. Policies have been implemented to enforce their usage in some places,
but in general, it has been up to the individuals to decide whether to wear a mask or not based
on their own risk assessment. In this section, we model this via game theory. We assume there
are several mask types, giving different level of protection:
• No Mask: This corresponds to the behavior of using no masks during the COVID-19
(or any) pandemic. Its cost is consequently 0; however, it does not offer any protection
against the virus.
• Out Mask: This is the most widely used mask (e.g., cloth mask or surgical mask). They
are meant to protect the environment of the individual using it. They work by filtering
out droplets when coughing, sneezing or simply talking, therefore hinders the spreading
of the virus. They do not protect the wearer itself against an airborne virus. The cost
corresponding to this protection type is noted as Cout > 0.
• In Mask: This is the most protective prevention gear designed for medical professionals
(e.g., FFP2 or FFP3 mask with valves). Valves make it easier to wear the mask for
a sustained period of time and prevent condensation inside the mask. They filter out
airborne viruses while breathing in, however the valved design means it does not filter
air breathed out. Note that CDC guidelines2 recommend using a cloth/surgical mask for
the general public, while valved masks are only recommended for medical personnel in
direct contact with infected individuals. The cost of this protection is Cin >> Cout.
Besides which mask they use (i.e., the available strategies), the players are either susceptible
or infected3. The latter has some undesired consequence; hence, we model it by adding a cost
Ci to these players’ utility (which is magnitudes higher than Cin and Cout). Using these states
and masks, we can present the basic game’s payoffs where two players with known status meet
and decide which mask to use. On the left of Table 2, the payoff matrix corresponds to the
case when both players are susceptible. Note, that in case both players are infected, the payoff
2https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html
3We simplify the well-known SIR model [8, 5] since in case of COVID-19 it is currently unknown how the
human body behaves after recovery when exposed again to the virus.
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matrix would be the same with an additional constant Ci. On the right of Table 2 corresponds
to the case when one player is infected while the other is susceptible. Note that since the game
is symmetric, it does not matter which player is which.
susceptible / susceptible susceptible / infected
no out in no out in
no (0, 0) (0, Cout) (0, Cin) (Ci, Ci) (0, Cout + Ci) (Ci, Cin + Ci)
out (Cout, 0) (Cout, Cout) (Cout, Cin) (Cout + Ci, Ci) (Cout, Cout + Ci) (Cout + Ci, Cin + Ci)
in (Cin, 0) (Cin, Cout) (Cin, Cin) (Cin, Ci) (Cin, Cout + Ci) (Cin, Cin + Ci)
Table 2: Payoff matrices for the cases when only one (right) and both (left) player is susceptible.
On the left side of Table 2 it is visible that both players’ cost is minimal when they do
not use any masks, i.e., the Nash Equilibrium of the game when both players are susceptible
is (no, no). This is also the social optimum, meaning that the players’ aggregated cost is
minimal. The same holds in case both players are infected, as this only adds a constant Ci to
the payoff matrix. This changes when only one of the players is susceptible (i.e., right side of
Table 2): the infected player using no mask is a dominant strategy for her, since it is her best
response, independently of the susceptible player’s action. Consequently, the best option for
the susceptible player is in, i.e., the NE is (in, no). On the other hand, the social optimum is
different: (no,out) would incur the least burden on the society since Cout << Cin.
In social optimum, susceptible players would benefit, through a positive externality, from
an action that would impose a cost on infected players; therefore it is not a likely outcome. In
fact, such a setting is common in man-made distributed systems, especially in the context of
cybersecurity. A well-fitting parallel is defense against DDoS attacks [9]: although it would be
much more efficient to filter malicious traffic at the source (i.e., out), Internet Service Providers
rather filter at the target (i.e., in) owing to a rational fear of free-riding by others.
3.1 Bayesian Game
Since in the basic game no player plays out, we simplify the choice of the players to either use
a mask or no (hence, we note the cost of a mask with Cuse). To represent the situation better,
we introduce ambiguity about the status of the players: we denote the probability of being
infected as ρ. We know from the basic game that if both players are infected (with probability
ρ2) or susceptible (with probability (1 − ρ)2) they play (no,no), while if only one of them is
infected (with probability 2 ·ρ · (1−ρ)) the infected player plays no while the susceptible plays
use.
In this Bayesian game the players play no most of the cases (e.g., with probability 1− (ρ ·
(1 − ρ))). This chain of thought is too simplistic, as we assumed case-wise that the players
know their status. Consequently, with uncertainty we must minimize the costs of the players:
if both players are infected with equal probability, the payoff for Player 2 is Equation (1) where
pn is the probability that Player n plays use (otherwise she plays no). The payoff for the other
player is similar since the game is symmetric. In more detail, the first two lines correspond to
the case when Player 2 is not infected (hence the multiplication with 1− ρ at the beginning),
while the last line captures when she is infected. Either way, she plays use with probability p2,
which costs Cuse. Otherwise she plays no, which has no cost except when Player 1 is infected
and she plays no as well (end of the second line).
U2 = (1− ρ) · [ (1− ρ) · [ p2· Cuse+ (1− p2)· 0]+
ρ · [ p2· Cuse+ (1− p2) · [ (1− p1) · Ci + p1 · 0]]]
+ρ· Ci · [ p2· Cuse+ (1− p2)· 0]
(1)
Since this formula is linear in p2, its extreme point within [0,1] is at the edge. We take its
derivative to uncover the function steepness: the condition for the function to be decreasing
(i.e., higher probability for using a mask corresponds to lower cost) is seen below. Here the first
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two parts are strictly positive, so to make the formula negative the cost of a mask Cuse must
be lower than (1−ρ)(1−p1)), which is below 1.4 Consequently, the only scenario which might
admit wearing a mask with non-zero probability corresponds to the availability of extremely
cheap masks.
∂U2
∂p2
< 0⇔ ρ
1− ρ ·
Ci
Cuse
· (Cuse − (1− ρ) · (1− p1)) < −1 (2)
3.2 Efficiency Game
In the basic game we assumed in provides perfect protection from infected players, while out
protects the other player fully.However, in real life these strategies only mitigate the virus
by decreasing the infection probability (i.e., ρ) to some extent. For this reason, we define
a, b ∈ [0, 1] in a way that the smaller value of the parameter corresponds to better protection;
a measures the protection efficiency of the protection strategy, while b captures the efficiency
of eliminating the further spread of the disease. Consequently, a and b was set in the previous
cases to aout = 0, ain = 1 (both in prevents further spread fully, while out does not prevent
it at all), bout = 1 (out has no effect on protecting the player) bin = 0 (in fully protects the
player).
We simplify the action space of the players as we did in the Bayesian game: in and out
is merged into use, with efficiency parameters a and b. We set b = 23 , as surgical masks on
the infectious person reduce cold & flu viruses in aerosols by 70% according to [12], while a
home-made mask achieves 2/3 of this efficiency [4]. Parameter a is much harder to measure.
It should be a ≤ b since any mask keeps the virus inside the players is more efficiently than
stopping the wearer from getting infected. For the sake of the analysis we set a = b2 =
1
3 .
We are interested in the mask-wearing probability of a susceptible player when the other
player is infected.5 The utility in such a situation is shown in Equation (3), where for sim-
plification we defined p = p1 = p2, i.e., both players play a specific strategy with the same
probability. With such a constraint, we restrict ourselves from finding all the solutions; how-
ever, since the game is symmetric, an equilibrium of this reduced game is also an equilibrium
when the players could use a different strategy distribution.
U = p2 · (Cuse + Ci · a · b) + p · (1− p) · (Cuse + Ci · a) + (1− p) · p · (Ci · b) + (1− p)2 · (Ci)
U = p2 · (Cuse + Ci · 0.2˙) + p · (1− p) · (Cuse + Ci) + (1− p)2 · Ci
(3)
From this we easily deduce that use corresponds to a smaller cost that no if CuseCi <
7
9 ,
which holds by default as Cuse  Ci (even for more inefficient masks). Moreover, use (i.e.,
p = 1) is the best response most of the time because of the following.
1. The utility is a second order polynomial, hence it has one extreme point.
2. This extreme point is a minimum due to U ′′ = 49 · Ci > 0.
3. The utility (i.e., cost) is decreasing on the left and increasing on the right of this minimum
point.
4. The utility’s minimum point is at p = 94 · Ci−CuseCi due to U ′ = Cuse − Ci + 49 · Ci · p.
5. The minimum point is expected to be above 1 due to Cuse  Ci.
6. p ∈ [0, 1] is on the left of the minimum point, hence, a higher p corresponds to a smaller
cost.
4This unit by itself is meaningless; it has to be compared to Ci.
5The Bayesian game combined with efficiency is left for future work due to the lack of space.
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3.3 Multi Player Game
This game can be further extended by allowing more players to participate. In this extension,
if there exists an infected player (who plays no as we showed already), all the susceptible
players should play in. This NE is the SO as well if the ratio of the infected (which is identical
to the probability ρ of being infected) is sufficiently high: the accumulated cost when the
susceptible players play in (and the infected play no) is less than the accumulated cost when
the infected players play out (and the susceptible play no) if CinCout <
ρ
1−ρ . Although it is
mathematically possible that the infected plays no in the SO, but it is doubtful: both the cost
of in is significantly higher than out, and the infection ratio ρ is low (at least at the beginning
of the pandemic).
4 The Distancing Game
Another thing most people has experienced during the current COVID-19 pandemic is social
distancing. Here we introduce a simple Distancing Game; it is to be played in sequence with
the previously introduced Mask Game: once a player decided to meet up with friends via the
Distancing Game, she can decide whether to wear a mask for the meeting using the mask game.
A summary of the used parameters are enlisted in Table 1: we represent the cost of getting
infected with m ·L, i.e., the mortality rate of the disease multiplied with the player’s evaluation
about her own life.6 We set m = 0.1, as this value is approximately in the middle of the possible
interval7: 0.06 ≈ #{dead}#{all cases} < m < #{dead}#{closed cases} ≈ 0.14
Besides the risk of getting infected, going out or attending a meeting could benefit the
player, denoted as B. On the other hand, staying home or missing a meeting could have some
additional costs, denoted as C. The probability of getting infected is denoted as ρ. With these
notations, the utility of the Distancing Game is captured on the left of Equation (4), where p
is the probability of going out. Since this is linear in p, its maximum is either at p = 0 (stay
home) or p = 1 (go out). Precisely, the player prefers to stay home if the right side of Equation
(4) holds.
U = p · (B − ρ ·m · L)− (1− p) · C B + C
ρ ·m < L (4)
Example. For instance, a rational American citizen should go out only if she values her
life less than 2941(= 10.0034·0.1 ) times the benefit (of going out) and the loss (of staying home)
together if we approximate the infection ratio with #{active cases}#{population} = 0.0034 as of 20th of May,
2020. According to [16], the value of a statistical life in the US was 9.2 million USD in 2013,
which is equivalent to 11.3 million USD in 2020 (with 0.3% interest rate). This means a
rational average American should only meet someone if the benefit of the meeting and the cost
of missing it would amount to more than 3842 USD (= 11.3M2941 ).
4.1 Number of Participants & Duration
One way to improve the above model is by introducing meeting duration and size. Leaving
our disinfected home during a pandemic is risky, and this risk grows with the time we spend
outside. Similarly, a meeting is riskier when there are multiple participants involved. In the
original model, we captured the infection probability with ρ = 1− (1− ρ). This ratio increases
to 1 − (1 − ρ)g·t when there are g possible infectious sources for t time. Since g and t are
interchangeable, we merge this two together under a common notation: z = g · t.
This extended model can be used to determine the optimal duration and size of a meeting,
once the player decided to go out according to the basic distancing game. We define 0 < z <
100, as no player has infinite time or meeting partners. Moreover, the benefit and the loss of
attending and missing a meeting should depend on this new parameter. For instance, staying
6This is an optimistic approximation, as besides dying the infection could bear other tolls on a player.
7All statistics in the paper from https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ (accessed May 20th, 2020)
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home in isolation for a longer period might cause anxiety, which could get worst over time
(i.e., increasing the cost), or attending a meeting with many friends at the same time could
significantly boost the experience (i.e., increase the benefit). Consequently, a rational person
should leave her home only if Equation (5) holds which is the extension of the right side of
Equation (4).
max
0<z<100
(
B(z) + C(z)
(1− (1− ρ)z) ·m
)
< L (5)
In Figure 1, we present three use-cases of the formula inside the maximization above: the
left one represents the case when both the benefit and the cost are constant, the right one
corresponds to the case when both of them are linear. In the middle is a mixture of these two.
Note that we needed to restrict z to be under a certain amount; otherwise, the formula goes
to infinity as z →∞ in some cases.
Figure 1: A few examples for various benefit and cost functions of the lower limit on the life
value which would ensure that a rational American would stay home (i.e., the formula inside
max in Equation (5)). x axis represents z, while y axis represents the utility.
Example. Let us assume, a bus’ tank is leaking; the owner is loosing 1 USD of petrol every
t time, i.e., C(z) = 1 · t (as the owner must visit a mechanic and meet one person). In the
meantime, the benefit of leaving the house is constant, e.g., B(z) = 1. The middle of Figure
1 corresponds to this setting. It is visible, that going out for a short or long period (e.g.,
z = 5 and z = 100) is only rational for someone who values her life below 3553 and 3499 USD,
respectively.
5 Pandemic Mechanism Design
Pandemic response is a complex affair. The two games described above model only parts of
the bigger picture.
5.1 The government as mechanism designer
We refer to the collection (and interplay) of measures implemented by a specific government
fighting the epidemic in their respective country as mechanism. Consequently, decisions made
with regard to this mechanism constitutes mechanism design [10]. In its broader interpretation,
mechanism design theory seeks to study mechanisms achieving a particular preferred outcome.
Desirable outcomes are usually optimal either from a social aspect or maximizing a different
objective function of the designer.
In the context of the corona pandemic, the immediate response mechanism is composed of
e.g., wearing a mask, social distancing, testing and contact tracing, among others. Note that
this is not an exhaustive list: financial aid, creating extra jobs to accommodate people who
have just lost their jobs, declaring a national emergency and many other conceptual vessels
can be utilized as sub-mechanisms by the mechanism designer, i.e., usually, the government;
we do not discuss all of these in detail due to the lack of space. Instead, we shed light on how
7
government policy can affect the sub-mechanisms, how sub-mechanisms can affect each other
and, finally, the outcome of the mechanism itself. We illustrate the importance of mechanism
design applying different policies to our two games, and adding testing and contact tracing to
the mix.
5.2 Policy impact on sub-mechanisms and the final mechanism
Here we analyze the impact of commonly seen policies: compulsory mask wearing, distributing
free masks, limiting the amount of people gathering and total lock-down.
Compulsory mask wearing and free masks. If the government declares that wearing a
simple mask is mandatory in public spaces (such as shops, mass transit, etc.), it can enforce an
outcome (out,out) that is indeed socially better than the NE. The resulting strategy profile is
still not SO, but it i) allocates costs equally among citizens; ii) works well under the uncertainty
of one’s health status; and iii) may decrease the first-order need for large-scale testing, which in
turn reduces the response cost of the government. By distributing free masks, the government
can reduce the effect of selfishness and, potentially, help citizens who cannot buy or afford
masks owing to supply shortage or unemployment.
Limiting the amount of people gathering and total lock-down. If the government
imposes an upper limit l for the size of congregations, this will put a strict upper bound on the
“optimal meeting size” g∗, and the resulting group size will be min(l, g∗). Note that if l < g∗
then it creates an “opportunity” for longer meetings (larger t), as Equation (5) maximizes for
z = gt. On the other hand, if the chosen restrictive measure is a total lock-down, both the
Distancing Game and the Mask Game are rendered moot, as people are not allowed to leave
their households.
Testing and contact tracing. It is clear that the Distancing and the Mask Games are not
played in isolation: people deciding to meet up invoke the decision situation on mask wearing.
On the other hand, so far we have largely ignored two other widespread pandemic response
measures: testing and contact tracing.
With appropriately designed and administered coronavirus tests, medical personnel can
determine two distinct features of the tested individual: i) whether she is actively infected
spreading the virus and ii) whether she has already had the virus, even if there were no or
weak symptoms. (Note that detecting these two features require different types of tests, able
to show the presence of either the virus RNA or specific antibodies, respectively.) In general,
testing enables both the tested person and the authorities to make more informed decisions.
Putting this into the context of our games, testing i) reduces the uncertainty in Bayesian
decision making, and ii) enables the government to impose mandatory quarantine thereby
removing infected players. Even more impactful, mandatory testing as in Wuhan completely
eliminates the Bayesian aspect rendering the situation to a full information game: it serves as
an exogenous “health oracle” imposing no monetary cost on the players. To sum it up, the
testing sub-mechanism outputs results that serve as inputs to both the Distancing and the
Mask Game.
Naturally, a “health oracle” does not exist: someone has to bear the costs of testing. From
the government’s perspective, mandatory mass testing is extremely expensive. (Similarly,
from the concerned individual’s perspective, a single test could be unaffordable.) Contact
tracing, whether traditional or mobile app-based, serves as an important input sub-mechanism
to testing [7]. It identifies the individuals who are likely affected and inform both them and
the authorities about this fact. In game-theoretic terms, for such players, the benefit of testing
outweigh the cost (per capita) with high probability. From the mechanism designer’s point of
view, contact tracing reduces the overall testing cost by enabling targeted testing, potentially
by orders of magnitude, without sacrificing proper control of the pandemic. Note that mobile
OS manufacturers are working on integrating contact tracing into their platform to eliminate
adoption costs for installing an app [1].
The big picture. As far as pandemic response goes, the mechanism designer has the power
to design and parametrize the games that citizens are playing, taking into account that sub-
mechanisms affect each other. After games have been played and outcomes have been deter-
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Figure 2: Pandemic response mechanism as influenced by government policy (dotted lines) and
the interplay of sub-mechanisms (solid lines)
mined, the cost for the mechanism designer itself are realized (see Figure 2). This cost function
is very complex incorporating factors from ICU beds through civil unrest to a drop in GDP
over multiple time scales [11]. Therefore, governments have to carefully balance the – very
directly interpreted – social optimum and their own costs; this requires a mechanism design
mindset.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have made a case for treating pandemic response as a mechanism design
problem. Through simple games modeling interacting selfish individuals we have shown that
it is necessary to take incentives into account during a pandemic. We have also demonstrated
that specific government policies significantly influence the outcome of these games, and how
different response measures (sub-mechanisms) are interdependent. As an example we have
discussed how contact tracing enables targeted testing which in turn reduces the uncertainty
from individual decision making regarding social distancing and wearing masks. Governments
have significantly more power than traditional mechanism designers in distributed systems;
therefore it is crucial for them to carefully study the tradeoff between social optimality and
the cost of the designer when implementing their pandemic response mechanism.
Limitations and future work. Clearly, we have just scratched the surface of pandemic
mechanism design. The models presented are simple and are mostly used for demonstra-
tive purposes. Also, the mechanism design considerations are only quasi-quantitative without
proper formal mathematical treatment. In turn, this gives us plenty of opportunity for future
work. A potential avenue is extending our models to capture the temporal aspect, combine
them with epidemic models as games played on social graphs, and parametrize them with real
data from the ongoing pandemic (policy changes, mobility data, price fluctuations, etc.). Re-
laxing the rational decision-making aspect is another prominent direction: behavioral modeling
with respect to obedience, other-regarding preferences and risk-taking could be incorporated
into the games. Finally, a formal treatment of the mechanism design problem constitutes
important future work, incorporating hierarchical designers (WHO, EU, nations, municipality,
household), an elaborate cost model, and analyzing optimal policies for different time horizons.
If done with care, these steps would help create an extensible mechanism design framework
that can aid decision makers in pandemic response.
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